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Abstract. Counterfeiting is a very serious threat to supply chain man-
agement systems. RFID systems are widely used to automate and speed
up the process of remotely identifying products, however these systems
are vulnerable to counterfeiting. In this paper, we propose a hierarchical
anti-counterfeiting mechanism which uses a layered approach to identify
dishonest middle parties involved in both counterfeiting and processing
stolen/missing items. Our layered approach, which is designed for EPC
Class-1 Gen-2 standard compliant tags, offers scalability and is suitable
for different sizes of groups of tagged items.
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1 Introduction
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) systems are extensively used in
many applications. In this paper, we discuss their deployment in sup-
ply chain management, where an RFID system is capable of identify-
ing products throughout the supply chain process [1]. Such systems have
three main components: 1) a server (usually centralized), 2) readers (from
tens to hundreds, depending on the application), and 3) tags (potentially
millions). A tagged object starts its journey in a large group from manu-
facturer to customer [2]. During this journey, the object may be read by
readers located from the manufacturing company through to retail stores.
RFID technology has replaced barcode mainly because items can be
individually identified without line-of-sight requirements [3]. Although
RFID systems face similar challenges to those faced by barcode technolo-
gies, such as cloning and impersonation, RFID systems have the advan-
tage that they are capable of providing identification as well as authen-
tication. However, counterfeiting, caused by cloning and impersonation
attacks, has been a problem for some RFID systems [3]. The counterfeit-
ing of products is one of the most serious threats to modern commerce
according to estimates by the Counterfeiting Intelligence Bureau (CIB) of
the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), which claims that coun-
terfeit goods account for up to 7% of world trade [4]. To address coun-
terfeiting, RFID researchers have designed many schemes which trade-off
between cost, security, and performance, however existing approaches all
have significant drawbacks which we outline in Section 2.
Since a tag will respond to every query sent by any compatible reader,
if no authentication mechanism is employed, an adversary can query a
genuine tag and learn the sensitive information associated with the tag’s
identifier which can then be used to make counterfeit tags. When using
authentication, a tag will respond to every query sent by a compatible
reader that has been authenticated as legitimate. However, the adversary
can still eavesdrop the tag’s identifier and then copy this information to a
counterfeit tag. So there is a need for secure identification with authenti-
cation in which case a tag will securely provide its information in response
to every query sent by a compatible reader that has been authenticated
as legitimate. Although an adversary cannot learn the sensitive informa-
tion, if this information is static then it can be copied or replayed by
counterfeit tags to impersonate genuine tags. Finally the adversary can
collude with legitimate but dishonest middle parties to gain benefits.
Considering these threats and capabilities of the adversary, we now
propose an anti-counterfeiting mechanism for EPC Class-1 Gen 2 stan-
dard [5] compliant tags (EPC tags). Our mechanism uses three layers
of verification. It is based on the use of shared secrets to generate dy-
namic verification codes which change in each transaction and can be
used to verify groups of tags, as well as individual tags. Our scheme not
only provides protection against counterfeiting but also identifies dishon-
est middle parties. Additionally, it can detect any missing or stolen items
and is sufficiently scalable to be applicable to the complete lifecycle of a
tagged object within a supply chain management system.
2 Existing Work
There are several existing approaches to managing RFID counterfeiting
(see [6,7]). We briefly review some schemes and identify their drawbacks.
2.1 Unique Serial Numbers
Several proposals [8, 9] use unique serial numbers to identify products.
These numbers are compared against a database to check legitimacy and
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highlight any missing items. However, this technique is detection only and
does not prevent counterfeiting since the serial number is transmitted in
the clear and any adversary can eavesdrop the serial number in order to
clone or impersonate it. If a genuine tag is removed and a counterfeit tag
is impersonated as genuine, this scheme cannot detect it.
A number of proposed schemes [8, 10, 11] include a track and trace
method where a counterfeit or missing item can be tracked down and
traced back anywhere in the process. This is done using the complete trail
of the exchanges of cloned tag updated by each shipping and receiving
record. However, this approach is time consuming and creates bottlenecks
if multiple clones are detected at the same time as each cloned tag is
individually checked using its complete shipping record from the database.
Another drawback of this approach is that a genuine but dishonest retailer
can copy a genuine tag and attach this copy to a counterfeit product. They
can then sell the counterfeit to a customer, who verifies it to be legitimate
using track and trace process, not updated by the retailer or the middle
parties [10]. Since this process needs an update by each middle party,
therefore it is vulnerable to both intentional and unintentional errors [6].
2.2 Cryptographic Anti-counterfeit Mechanisms
Cryptographic mechanisms can be used to tackle counterfeits. The ba-
sic idea is to base authentication on a secret value possessed by each
tag, which is then disclosed to the verifier as a proof of authenticity in
a challenge-response protocol [12]. This approach may be based on sym-
metric cryptography or asymmetric cryptography.
If symmetric cryptography is used [13–16], the secret is already known
to the verifier who matches it with the secret value received from the tag.
To avoid a single point of failure, each tag is given a unique secret key,
hence there will potentially be millions of such keys. One approach to
establishing all these keys is to distribute all keys to each reader in the
form of a local database. However if a reader is compromised then this
approach results in the breaking of the whole system. A preferred ap-
proach is to store all the keys in an online database which each reader
can access. However, this results in extensive communication and compu-
tational overheads [17], even higher than the track and trace approach. In
addition, the reader needs to be trusted by the supplier since the reader
stores or accesses the secret values of the tags in this system.
In contrast, asymmetric cryptography can be used [17–19] to dis-
tribute keys. However, this still requires each tag to have a unique se-
cret key and involves considerable computational overheads. Although
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researchers have proposed some lightweight public key cryptographic sys-
tems, it is still unclear whether such schemes can be deployed in the
resource-constrained low-cost RFID systems in supply chain management.
2.3 Unclonable RFID tags
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are tamper-proof, unclonable items
of hardware which produce a unique signature, given an input. In [20]
an oﬄine authentication scheme based on physically printed challenge-
response pairs from a certain PUF was proposed for tag authentication.
However, the printout has to be physically read and cannot easily be au-
tomated. Further, it is relatively easy to program a cloned tag to give re-
sponses to particular challenges instead of using a PUF. These issues were
addressed in another PUF-based scheme [21], but tracking of a tag is pos-
sible in this scheme as the PUF identifier is unique and does not change.
Moreover, it is infeasible to maintain a large number of challenge-response
pairs for one tag, potentially resulting in the few challenge-response en-
tries being eavesdropped and the cloning of the tag.
2.4 Built-in Passwords
Juels has suggested a solution based on the tag’s built-in passwords to
counter the threat of cloning [22]. The idea is to use the existing Kill
and Access password PINs to perform mutual authentication in order
to avoid cloning. The reader sends a set of apparently random values
except that one is the correct password PIN. The tag in response has
to send the position of the correct PIN to get its legitimacy verified.
However, legitimate but dishonest readers can store the complete set of
PINs with a tag’s responses to clone the tag. Even if the reader is honest,
the challenge set of PINs and responses can be eavesdropped. Juels also
noted that this scheme is not secure against a simple three-step attack [22]
based on skimming a tag identifier, interacting with the reader to obtain
the challenge set of PINs, and then using these to obtain the correct PIN.
3 A Hierarchical Anti-counterfeiting Mechanism
We now propose a new approach to prevent counterfeiting in supply chain
processes where tags travel in groups. Our mechanism is based on a hi-
erarchical model which involves three layers of verification. The three
layers can be considered to range from low to high complexity with re-
spect to trade-offs between cost, performance and level of security. If an
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upper layer verification fails, verification drops down to the next layer.
We design new first and second layers, and then use the track and trace
approach [8] for the third layer.
3.1 Goals
Our mechanism is designed to achieve the following goals:
1. Anti-cloning. Protection against copying the data from a genuine
tag attached to a legitimate product and cloning it onto another tag
attached to a counterfeit (see Section 2.1).
2. Anti-spoofing. Protection against replay (impersonation) attacks
(see Sections 2.3 and 2.4).
3. Anti-theft. Detection of stolen or missing items.
4. Scalability. Ability to operate efficiently when tags are in large groups
as well as when a tag is attached to a single item.
5. Compatibility. Compatible with EPC Class-1,Gen-2 standard tags.
6. Efficient Key Management. Supportable using an efficient key
management scheme (see Section 2.2).
7. Good Throughput. Avoidance of bottlenecks which degrade the
overall supply chain system throughput (see Section 2.2).
3.2 The Layered Approach
The three hierarchical layers used for the legitimacy verification of a prod-
uct (see Figure 1) are:
1. Group Verification (GV) Layer. For most of their journey in the
supply chain products travel in groups (based on their type, specifi-
cation, manufacturer and lot number, etc.) Our first layer verifies a
complete group. In this layer the reader does not need continuous ac-
cess to a central repository for verifying each tag because the complete
group is read first and then verified as a whole.
2. Product Verification (PV) Layer. If GV layer verification fails,
product verification is initiated using an individual tag’s verification
code. This lowers the performance and throughput since the reader
has to access the database multiple times. Since the server verifies
the legitimacy of a single product, the additional computational over-
heads are acceptable since the server is anticipated to be powerful. The
PV layer identifies individual products that are either counterfeit or
missing, their values and complete specifications.
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3. Track and Trace (TT) Layer. After the PV layer has identified
counterfeit or missing products, track and trace is initiated using the
complete shipping/receiving record of the product. This gathers im-
portant information that includes the location of the anomaly and the




Fig. 1. Hierarchical Verification Model.
Each layer of hierarchical verification detects anomalies in the supply
chain in the following order:
1. GV Anomaly Detection. GV mainly fails if the reader is not le-
gitimate, a counterfeit is detected, or a tag is completely missing.
When GV fails, this will generate an alarm in the server. The server
will record the location and details of the reader where the alarm is
raised. The server then switches to the PV layer.
2. PV Anomaly Detection. PV identifies the exact cause of GV fail-
ure. It highlights the exact tagged product which is either counterfeit
or missing. The server makes a corresponding entry.
3. TT Anomaly Detection. TT is carried out as a last step which
recovers the complete shipping/receiving record of the tag that was
identified in PV anomaly detection. This further shows whether more
clones exist in the supply chain, or whether the original product is
completely missing. The server records the details of anomalies.
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3.3 Hierarchical Anti-counterfeiting Mechanism
We now explain the detailed operation of our hierarchical anti-counterfeiting
mechanism. The notation used is summarized in Table 1.
Table 1. Notation
Notation Description
S The server holding the database with shared secrets.
Gj The group consisting of many tags with identifier j.
HV Ti The tag employing HV mechanism with identifier i.
IDi Tag’s (with index i) secret, static and unique identity
such as EPC.
Rh The reader with identifier h scanning groups of tags.
Ktj The group secret key embedded in every tag belonging
to group Gj .
KMr The master key given to every reader in supply chain
system.
KDF A key derivation function agreed between the server and
all readers.
KShj The session key derived from master key KMr by the
reader Rh using KDF , currently scanning group Gj .
randj Random number generated by server to be sent as chal-
lenge for a particular group Gj or tag HV Tj verification.
TV Ci A tag verification code used to verify the legitimacy of a
tag HV Ti.
RV Ch A reader verification code used to verify the legitimacy
of a reader Rh.
GV Cj A group verification code used to verify the legitimacy of
a group Gj of tags.
EGV Cj An encrypted version of group verification code GV Cj .
Ttimeout The maximum time after a server S sends randj to the
reader and acquires GV Cj or TV Cj .
L Length of the secret keys and static identity.
F : K ×X → Y A lightweight secure PRF such as Hummingbird-2 [23]
designed for EPC Class-1 Gen-2 compliant tags.
E : K ×X → X A secure PRP such as AES defined over (K,X).
X ⊕ Y Exclusive-OR of two values X and Y .
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Key Distribution Phase. In this phase, the supplier who is responsible
for shipping the tagged items in groups (or stand alone as explained in
Section 3.1) to different geographic locations holds a database with shared
secrets. This database is securely connected to a supplier’s or Trusted
Third Party’s (TTP) server S. The supplier distributes the keys as shown
















Fig. 2. Key Distribution Phase.
type, specification, application, date of manufacture, lot number, date of
expiry and geographic location, etc. Since, n m, it is easy to distribute
a total of m keys to n tags (the same key for each tag belonging to one
group). The number of readers that scan these groups is denoted by s.
The supplier distributes one master key KMr to each reader.
Group Verification Phase. After the key distribution phase is com-
plete, and the supplier makes corresponding entries in the database, the
groups of tagged items are shipped to their respective locations. When
a group reaches a particular reader in the supply chain process, the GV
phase is initiated. The protocol is shown in Figure 3 and is as follows:
1. The reader Rh initiates an EPC Class-1 Gen-2 UHF protocol.
2. The tag HV Ti (whose slot-counter is zero, see [5]) responds showing






















Fig. 3. Group Verification Protocol.
3. The reader sends this group identifier Gj and its own identifier Rh to
server S.
4. The server S generates a random nonce randj and sends it to the
reader Rh along with the total number of tags d in group Gj .
5. The reader Rh then forwards randj to each tag.
6. Each tag computes its verification code and sends it to reader Rh. Tag
HV Ti belonging to group Gj computes its TV Ci as follows:
TV Ci = IDi ⊕ F (Ktj , randj). (1)
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7. The reader Rh computes a GV C by XOR-ing with the previous TV C
every time it receives a new TV C, until all d tags have responded:
GV Cj = TV Ci ⊕ ...⊕ TV Cd. (2)
8. The reader Rh computes a session key as:
KShj = KDF (KMr, Rh, Gj). (3)
9. The reader Rh encrypts randj to compute RV Ch and GV Cj using
KShj , and sends it as EGV Cj along with the total number of tags d
′
that it read within time Ttimeout to the server S. RV Ch and EGV Cj
are computed as follows:
RV Ch = E(KShj , randj). (4)
EGV Cj = E(KShj , GV Cj). (5)
10. The server first checks the legitimacy of reader Rh by decrypting
RV Ch. The server S next checks that reader Rh has read all the
tags from the value of d
′
(to determine any missing/dummy tags).
The server S finally decrypts the EGV Cj sent by reader Rh to check
whether GV Cj is correct:






All tags have been read;
Check;
if D(KShj , EGV Cj) == GV Cj then
Gj is successfully authenticated;








Rh is not legitimate;
Abandon the protocol;
end if
If the final ACK = Pass, this shows that group Gj has passed the GV
phase successfully. A corresponding entry is made in the database for the
group Gj scanned by reader Rh, which also helps in future transactions
with this particular reader in terms of trust level. The construction of the
GV layer is as shown in the example given in Figure 4, where the group
G1 consisting of four tags is being scanned by the reader R5.
ID1 ID2 ID3 ID4
G1
















EGV C1, RV C5, 4
Reader
side
Fig. 4. Construction of the GV Layer.
Product Verification Phase. When ACK = Fail is sent to reader
Rh, this shows that the GV layer has not verified the authenticity of the
























Fig. 5. Product Verification Protocol.
1. The reader Rh sends the tag identifiers HV Ts to the server.
2. The server S generates a random challenge rand for each tag.
3. The reader Rh forwards this challenge to the corresponding tag, re-
ceives the TV C and forwards it back to the server S.
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4. The server S verifies the legitimacy of an individual tag as follows:
if TV Ci == IDi ⊕ F (Ktj , randi) then
Tag with identifier HV Ti is a genuine tag;
else
Tag with identifier HV Ti is a counterfeit tag;
end if
5. At the end of this protocol, the server S is able to identify the coun-
terfeit tags as well as missing/dummy tags.
Track and Trace Phase. In the EPC Global Network Class-1,Gen-2
standard, the unique and secret identifier ID (the EPC) is used to track
and trace the tag’s movement throughout the supply chain. We give an
example in Figure 6 to explain the TT phase. Suppose that a particular
ID5, t1, 1 ID5, t2, 1 ID5, t3, 2 ID5, t4, 2 ID5, t5, 3 ID5, t6, 3
Receive Ship Receive Ship Receive Ship
Time
ID5, t1, 1 ID5, t2, 1 ID5, t3, 2 ID5, t4, 2 ID5, t5, 3
ID5, t1, 1 ID5, t2, 1 ID5, t3, 2 ID5, t4, 2
ID5, t1, 1 ID5, t2, 1 ID5, t3, 2 ID5, t4, 2 ID5, t5, 3 rand, t6, 3
ID5, t1, 1 ID5, t2, 1 ID5, t3, 2 ID5, t4, 2 rand, t5, 3
Fig. 6. Track and Trace Example.
item travels in a group through three different companies (Company 1,
2 and 3) before reaching its retailer. The server S maintains its receiving
and shipping record at each company. The entry ID5, t1, 1 shows that the
item with tag identifier ID5 was received at time t1 by Company 1. A
track and trace operation results in one of the following:
– Case 1: No anomaly. The first record in Figure 6 shows an ideal case
where a particular item ID5 is successfully shipped to the retailer.
– Case 2: Missing item within company. The second record is that
Company 3 received the item at t5 but never shipped it to the retailer.
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– Case 3: Missing item en-route. The third record shows the item
was shipped by Company 2 but was never received by Company 3.
– Case 4: Counterfeit item within company. The fourth record
shows that Company 3 received the original authentic item at t5 but
shipped a suspected counterfeit to the retailer.
– Case 5: Counterfeit item en-route. The last record shows that
Company 2 shipped the original authentic item at t4 but the item
received by Company 3 is a suspected counterfeit.
4 Analysis
We now carry out an analysis of our proposed anti-counterfeiting mech-
anism as to whether it achieves the desired goals of Section 3.1.
4.1 Anti-cloning
As discussed in Section 2.1, if a tag transmits its static secret identity ID
such as EPC in the clear then it can be copied easily. This unique iden-
tity of the tag is linked with its associated information, which potentially
includes value, composition and other useful supplier-related data. In the
proposed mechanism the tag hides this secret static identity in its veri-
fication code. The tag thus transmits its verification code which appears
to be random data. Thus an adversary cannot make a copy of the secret
static identity from a genuine tag. However the adversary can copy the
public identifier HV T of a tag to a counterfeit tag, but this counterfeit
tag will not be able to reproduce the correct verification code and thus
will fail the legitimacy verification.
4.2 Anti-spoofing
As discussed in Sections 2.3 and 2.4, static secret identities can be re-
played by a counterfeit tag to spoof as genuine. In the proposed mecha-
nism the secret information, transmitted for verification, changes in every
transaction because of the use of a fresh random nonce generated by the
server. An adversary can thus not replay this secret information during a
later transaction because of the use of a new nonce.
4.3 Anti-theft
The proposed mechanism employs a layered approach in order to detect
stolen/missing products. As described in Section 3.2, this approach can
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be used to identify the exact cause and location of any anomaly since the
final Track and Trace layer provides the complete shipping and receiving
record of the identified stolen/missing item. After tracing the root cause of
the anomaly, suitable processes can be undertaken to hold the responsible
parties accountable. Appropriate countermeasures can then be applied in
order to prevent this anomaly from occurring again.
We note that a smart adversary can prevent this detection by relay-
ing the genuine verification code from a stolen/missing item which is not
physically present in the vicinity of the scan range. To counter such an
adversary, we have employed a time-out clock within our scheme. The
server pre-computes this time, depending on the number of tags involved
in the scheme. The server then expects the reader to answer back within
that specified time. If the reader delays its response, this is an indica-
tion of a potential relay attack. The server can thus ask the respective
reader for a physical check for the completeness of this group and makes
a corresponding entry for this anomaly in its database.
4.4 Scalability
In supply chain environments, tags travel most part of their journey in
groups. These groups can be large, medium or even consisting of a sin-
gle item depending on their size, value, and application. Sometime these
groups change in their sizes en-route from manufacturer to end-users. Our
proposed group verification layer can verify any group irrespective of its
size and, during the product verification layer, the legitimacy of a single
tagged item is checked. Therefore, our scheme scales well through from
large groups, to medium and small groups, and even to stand-alone items.
4.5 Compatibility
The proposed mechanism uses the standard UHF Air Interface Protocol
as specified in [5]. If a tag is not employing hierarchical verification, it
can be read as per the existing standard.
4.6 Efficient Key Management
The proposed mechanism avoids some of the scalability problems of us-
ing symmetric cryptography by providing all tags belonging to a specific
group with a unique key. Since the number of groups is much smaller
than the number of tags, it is comparatively easy to manage the keys in
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the database. Additionally, all readers involved in the supply chain man-
agement system are only given one master key. By reducing the overall
number of keys in the system, the key management is considerably more
efficient than schemes with a unique key for each tag as mentioned in [17].
4.7 Good Throughput
The layered approach is partly designed to reduce the likelihood of po-
tential bottlenecks arising from readers having to stay online during au-
thentication and verification, and regularly interact with the database.
By first deploying relatively lightweight group-level checks we avoid bot-
tlenecks in the top layer of the hierarchical verification process. Overall
performance decreases in the lower layers, but these are only activated
if anomalies are detected during the group-level checking. In this way a
reasonable throughput can be expected of the system.
5 Conclusion
We have proposed a hierarchical anti-counterfeiting mechanism using
three layers of verification to determine the legitimacy of a tagged item.
The mechanism is designed for EPC Class-1 Gen-2 tags used in supply
chain management where counterfeiting present a very serious threat.
This threat is countered using dynamic verification codes generated us-
ing symmetric cryptography. Our model detects the stolen/missing items,
provides efficient key management, avoids bottlenecks and is scalable to
the complete lifecycle of tags in the supply chain. This approach also po-
tentially lends itself to deployment in schemes based on other standards.
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